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EDITORIAL
I
n the course of the financial crisis, a number of
countries have implemented unprecedented 
stabilization measures through both stand-alone
actions directed at individual institutions and
system-wide programmes. The objective of such
intervention was to avoid further bankruptcies,
especially of systemic relevant financial interme-
diaries, and to contribute to restoring a normal
functioning of financial intermediation. At the
time, these government support measures were
the right answer to limiting the impact of the
financial crisis on the real economy. 
Following the governmental intervention, a 
simple return to “business as usual” must not
be allowed. Instead, we need to reflect on the
following fundamental issues:
The turmoil in global financial markets has
raised a discussion on the functionality of the
market economy system due to the privatiza-
tion of profits in previously good times and the
socialization of losses during the sudden crisis.
In the real economy, the consequences of a mar-
ket failure remain limited to the respective mar-
ket concerned. This is not so for financial mar-
kets, where the breakdown of one institution
can cause the collapse of the whole financial sys-
tem with a considerable impact on the real econ-
omy – a correlation we know as systemic risk.
The crisis has made it obvious that a structured
approach for dealing with troubled systemic rel-
evant banks is seriously lacking. In this case, it
was taxpayers who had to carry the burden of
saving financial institutions. Banks that are “too
big to fail” are facing disincentives. The implicit
survival guarantee of the government for sys-
temic relevant financial institutions cannot be
withdrawn believably. Therefore, measures must
be implemented to avoid that this guarantee is
invoked in the first place.
The regulation of financial markets demands
more sophisticated and stringent approaches;
ones which avoid systemic risks and make pro-
visions for minimizing negative externalities in
case of a crisis. Regulation does not have to be as
dense as possible – key is in fact the elimination
of regulation-free areas and the implementation
of a stable regulation framework.
One of the biggest challenges remains extricating
governments from the “too big to fail” commit-
ment. The proposals made in this context include
higher capital requirements for system relevant
institutions, progressive taxation (by size) of risky
financial transactions, insurance premiums for
future rescue actions dependent on the size of
individual institutions, “living wills” for banks,
and the break up of institutions that exceed a
certain size. In spite of these numerous ideas, an
optimal solution is yet to be found. Beyond that,
a special bankruptcy law for financial institu-
tions could be beneficial, offering options for
restructuring institutions as well as for winding
them up and ensuring that no contagion effects
spill over to the financial sector.
The recent crisis has proved, once again, the need
for regulation to help deal with the problem of
systemic risk. It has further underlined that it is
no longer sufficient to rely on one- or two-di  men-
sional approaches for understanding and regu-
lating financial markets. Their increasing com-
plexity demands a comprehensive and interdis-
ciplinary exchange, including a continuous dia-
logue between researchers and practitioners. The
formation of the House of Finance through the
strong efforts of – among others – the financial
community as well as government authorities
demonstrates that this need has clearly been rec-
ognized, and that academics, market participants
and regulators are also willing to address it.
With best wishes,
Ladies and gentlemen,
Dear friends of the House of Finance,
Hannes Rehm
Spokesman of the
Management Committee Soffin
(Financial Markets
Stabilization Fund)
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A EUROPEAN MODEL COMPANY ACT
A
European Model Company Act is
being developed by a group of legal
experts from all EU member states on the
initiative of Theodor Baums, ILF, House
of Finance, Goethe University Frankfurt,
and Paul Krüger Andersen from Denmark’s
University of Aarhus. Model acts are
thought to serve as a tool box for national
regulators and as a benchmark for nation-
al laws. This technique provides an inter-
esting alternative to existing traditional
regulatory mechanisms.
Legislation in the area of company law at the
EU level has specific goals when compared
with legislation in this same area by individual
member states. The goals are to remove barriers
to the freedom to provide goods and services
across national borders, and to guarantee the
freedom of movement and of settlement within
the EU. Since 1999, the EU Court of Justice has
in a series of remarkable decisions launched a
competition for corporate charters in the EU.
This has been followed by a competition
among member states for better regulation in
the area of private limited liability companies. 
However, from the start of the European
Common Market, there has also been the
principle of an approximation of the laws of
member states in order to promote the goal of
a common market. This has led to far reaching
harmonization of certain areas of company law,
particularly regarding past consideration of
public limited liability companies. Harmoni  -
zation of company law at the EU level may
have advantages, but it also suffers from seri-
ous disadvantages. Therefore, various alterna-
tives have been discussed and tested in the
past. An alternative approach is presently
being tried out, namely the development of a
European Model Company Act.
TRADITIONAL AND NOVEL TOOLS OF LAWMAKING
The traditional approach to lawmaking in the
area of company law was harmonization of
national company laws: as regards public limit-
ed liability companies, in particular, by means
of binding directives. Harmonization of compa-
ny law has, as any other standardization meas-
ure, the advantage of reducing information and
transaction costs. Full harmonization of nation-
al company laws would perhaps meet the
expectations of corporations operating on a
European scale, which may ask for standardiza-
tion of operating rules and seek uniformity in
laws on investor protection and the disclosure
of information. That is, in order to reduce their
information and transaction costs. On the other
hand, harmonization also has serious disadvan-
tages. First, a central legislator is likely to be less
informed about the practical needs and the ade-
quacy of the rules developed than local legisla-
tors. Second, centralized legislation at the EU
level solidifies the solutions in so far as harmo-
nized rules are mandatory, and ex  cludes com-
petition for better regulation among member
states. Third, if there is a case for protecting
stakeholders outside a limited liability company
(e.g. small creditors) by means of mandatory
rules, confining regulation on public limited
companies in this regard, as is the case under
EU company law directives, is flawed. 
Therefore, if full harmonization of company
laws was ever an ambition, it has been given
up in favor of “minimum harmonization” of
the laws on public limited liability companies,
where necessary. This again means, however,
foregoing the advantages of homogenous and
standardized sets of rules for governing legal
forms of enterprise.
A less rigid approach than harmonization by
means of mandatory rules would be issuing
recommendations to member states. In the area
of company law, the European Commission
has issued such recommendations regarding
the remuneration of executive directors and
the independence of outside directors for list-
ed companies. 
An alternative and more recent approach is the
development of new company forms; ones aside from
Prof. Theodor Baums
Goethe University and Director
of the Institute for Law and
Finance
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the real national company forms now present in
member states, which compete with these forms.
Examples are the European Economic Interest
Grouping (EEIG), the Euro  pean Com  pany (SE),
and the European Coo  perative Society (SCE). A
statute for a European Private Company (SPE) is
being worked out right now by European
Commission staff. One problem with this solu-
tion is that the regulations for these forms refer
to a large extent to the regulations for compara-
ble national company forms. Thus, one can say,
for example, that there is not just one form of
SE, rather that there are still 27 different forms.
A DIFFERENT APPROACH
The European Model Company Act (EMCA)
will not lead to a legal instrument issued by
the European Union. Member states would
neither be ordered to implement an EU direc-
tive nor would the EU create yet another
European business form. To this extent, the
concept of a “European Model Company Act”
must not be misunderstood. An emphasis
should be placed on the word “model”. The
project aims to develop a model for a compa-
ny act that member states are free to adopt or
reject, following the US example of the now
revised Model Business Corporation Act
(RMBCA). Smaller member states which are
often pressed to staff and dispatch a team of
legal experts for the drafting of laws may con-
sider adopting the EMCA as a whole. For the
company acts of the other member states, the
EMCA is thought to serve as a benchmark. It
may be hoped that national legislatures will
hesitate before evoking national particularities
in order to deviate from the European “bench-
mark”, i.e. when faced with a model act that
has been specifically designed for uniform use
throughout the EU. Furthermore, a provision
of national law that restricts freedom of estab-
lishment will likely be scrutinized even more
strictly when it is incompatible with a model
act that has been designed and adopted by
experts from all member states.
CONTENT AND STATE OF THE DRAFT
The content of the EMCA will include broadly
acceptable uniform rules, building on the
common legal traditions of member states and
the existing acquis communautaire, but also con-
tribute to developing best practices based on
experiences from the modern company acts of
various member states. It will comprise rules
for both private and public limited companies.
Currently, the chapter on formation of compa-
nies has been finished and will be published
on the Group’s website (http://asb.dk/article.
aspx?pid=18496). This invites members of the
interested public to make comments. Several
other chapters are also presently being devel-
oped and discussed. The plan is to have a draft
completed by the end of 2012.
REFERENCES
Baums, Th., Krüger Andersen, P. (2009)
“The European Model Company Law Act Project”,
Tison, de Wulf, van der Elst, Steennot (eds.),
Per  spectives in Company Law and Financial
Re  gu  lation, Essays in Honour of Eddy Wy  -
meersch, pp. 5–17, Cambridge University Press
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„Wettbewerb der Privatrechtsordnungen im Euro  -
päischen Binnenmarkt“,
Beiträge zum internationalen Privatrecht, Max-
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Company Law in EU Member 
States – National legislators 
compete for corporate charters;
facilitated by the EU Court of
Justice’s decisions on the scope
of Art. 43, 48 EC.
EU Company Law Directives: “Minimum Harmonization”
The traditional approach, in particular with regard to public
limited liability companies: Advantages – reduces information
and transactions costs for market participants in the Euro  -
pean Union. Disadvantages – a central legislator is likely not
to be as informed about practical the needs and adequacy 
of rules as a local legislator; harmonization excludes regula-
tory competition among member states; also, the approach
currently focuses only on public limited liability companies.
EU Company Forms
 European (Public) Company (SE)
 European Economic Interest Group (EEIG)
 European Cooperative Society (SCE)
 European Private Company: a statute is currently being
drafted by the European Commission.
European Model Company Act (EMCA)
A model (“tool box”) for a company act that member states
are free to adopt or reject, partially or fully. Inspired by the
United States of America’s Revised Model Business Corpo  -
ration Act (RMBCA); rules for private und public limited 
companies based on the common legal traditions of member
states and the existing EU acquis communitaire; will contri-
bute to the development of best practices, based on modern
company acts in various member states.
Recommendations for Company Law
The EU Commission has issued non-binding recommen  -
dations to member states on the remuneration of executive
directors and on the independence of outside directors for
listed companies.
Graph 1: Company Law in the European Union
 Mandatory EU Law;   Non-Binding Instrument;   Mandatory EU Law;   Non-Binding Instrument;  
 The EMCA as a ‘template’ for smaller member states and as a ‘benchmark’ for all member states.;
 National company law legislation is subject to the restrictions of harmonized EU company law.;
 EU company forms build equally upon the regulations for their national counterparts, as they compete with national company forms.;
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PRICING TWO HETEROGENEOUS TREES
I
n this study, the authors examine the val-
uation of two structurally different stock
types. The stocks are represented in the
model as trees, and the two types differ in
that the parameters of the dividend dynam-
ics for the stocks of one type are constant,
while the dividend growth rate of the sec-
ond is stochastic. In the model, the authors
differentiate between situations in which
this additional source of uncertainty is
perfectly observable, and scenarios where
the signal investors receive about divi-
dend growth (e.g., from analysts' reports
that are still somewhat imprecise because
the firm’s history is short) may be very
noisy. In the worst case, there is no addi-
tional information about the expected
dividend growth at all, and investors
must base their expectations entirely on
the dividends they have observed.
The authors intend to use these model ele-
ments to demonstrate that there are indices,
e.g., on the world’s large stock markets, that
include predominantly established shares
(‘blue chips’), and young technology stocks
with largely unknown dynamics that tend to
be concentrated in other indices. Examples of
this in the USA are the Dow Jones Industrial
Index for blue chips, and the NASDAQ index
for technology stocks. In an international con-
text, similar distinctions may also be drawn
between mature economies and emerging
markets. Further generalizing the existing lit-
erature, the authors also consider how differ-
ent degrees of risk aversion of the representa-
tive investor affect the model results.
Previously, almost all model-based studies
have concentrated on the case of inveterate
short-term investors using logarithmic utility
function.
The purpose of the study by Branger, Schlag,
and Wu is therefore to identify equilibrium
implications of the structural difference
between the two stock types and of the differ-
ing degrees of risk aversion, in order to pro-
pose approaches to explaining empirical phe-
nomena that are ill explained, if at all, by con-
ventional models.
As Cochrane, Longstaff, and Santa-Clara have
demonstrated, the mere introduction of a sec-
ond stock into the standard model has
extraordinary effects on the dynamics of both
stocks. Branger, Schlag, and Wu thus continue
this line of investigation by analyzing addi-
tional effects resulting from the structural dif-
ference in dividend dynamics and varying
degrees of risk aversion. What expected excess
returns and what risk premiums do these two
stock types have in this model framework?
What risk do they represent? How do their
excess returns covary? How does the quality
of information in the model influence these
quantities?
The first part of the study examines the valua-
tion of the two types of stocks. Except for the
uncertainty of their average dividend growth,
they are identical, so any difference between
them can only be due to this small variation in
the model. It is shown that with logarithmic
utility function the information scenario has
no effect on the valuation of the market port-
folio, i.e., the portfolio consisting of both
stocks, which is exactly the same result as the
one found in the CLS study. However, the
prices of the two individual stocks do respond
to the additional uncertainty in the model. In
some cases, the price-dividend ratio is signifi-
Prof. Nicole Branger
Münster University
Prof. Christian Schlag  
Goethe University
Lue Wu
Goethe University
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cantly higher than in the CLS model. As a
result it should be noted that the information
scenario is not vital for static quantities like
prices.
The situation changes significantly when one
considers dynamic quantities, such as expect-
ed excess returns, volatilities, and correlations.
Especially if the representative investor is
more risk-averse than is reflected via a log-
arithmic utility function, many far-reaching
implications can be revealed that the CLS
model cannot produce. For example, one
might expect the return for the aggregate stock
market to become more volatile as uncertain-
ty increases (i.e., as the signal regarding
expected dividend growth becomes less reli-
able). But this is by no means always true. If
blue chip firms make up a small proportion of
total market value, the market is actually less
volatile than when the signal is better. How
can this result be explained? If the only indi-
cator of future dividend growth available to an
investor is the realized dividend of the young
firm, the informational effect of a high divi-
dend is relatively insignificant due to the lack
of a reliable data history, and the expected div-
idend growth rate is estimated substantially
lower. Thus, it is extremely difficult for the
investor to reliably predict how the dividend
stream from the young firm will change over
time, and therefore the price remains relative-
ly unchanged (accordingly, the excess return is
quite stable). Since in this scenario such young
firms represent a major part of the total value
of the economy, the value of the market port-
folio does not change by much.
Asset pricing analyses focus on risk premiums,
i.e., the compensation the investor expects
(and receives) in equilibrium for bearing the
different types of risks in the economy. One
would expect the risk premium among risk-
averse investors in equilibrium to be always
positive. The authors show that this is not nec-
essarily true, because the blue chip stock can
serve to some degree as a hedge against the
uncertainty of the young firm. It thus func-
tions as an insurance contract, and according-
ly has a negative risk premium. This effect
becomes more pronounced as the uncertainty
component in the dividend trend of young
firms grows. This result underscores the use-
fulness of equilibrium analyses, since the
obligatory balancing of supply and demand
reveals effects that cannot be mapped in par-
tial models.
Another area in which the structure of the
Branger, Schlag and Wu model offers impor-
tant new findings is the return correlation
between the two stocks in the model. Since
the actual dividend processes for the two
stocks are not correlated, any correlation can
only arise en  do  genously, i.e., solely due to the
price and return effects in equilibrium. In the
CLS model, the return correlation is not exact-
ly zero, but the level of the correlation origi-
nating from the model is relatively low. In the
extended model significantly larger correlation
bandwidths occur even for logarithmic utility
functions. But again, the effects are strongest
when the representative investor becomes
more risk-averse. In conclusion, stochastic
correlations, such as are encoun  tered time and
again in empirical analysis, may certainly be
caused by the differing dividend process struc-
tures of different stocks, particularly if it is not
possible to obtain perfect information regard-
ing expected dividend growth. This scenario
may be considered as relevant, because the
future development of young (high-tech)
firms is especially difficult to determine, and
during periods of rapid expansion, firms of this
kind are often associated with effects that defy
explanation using standard models.
As has been illustrated, the implications of the
study by Branger, Schlag and Wu are aimed
primarily at interpreting empirical findings for
capital markets. Apparent ‘anomalies’ can eas-
ily be deduced as equilibrium results within
the model framework. At the same time, the
basic model structure with varying informa-
tion quality for different segments of the stock
market is so close to reality that the conclu-
sions from the model can be used to provide at
least qualitative indicators for the behavior of
returns, volatilities and correlations.
REFERENCES
Cochrane, J. H., Longstaff, F. A., 
Santa-Clara, P. (2008)
“Two Trees”,
Review of Financial Studies Vol. 21, pp. 347–385.
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The full article is available at:
http://www.finance.uni-frankfurt.de/wp/
1390.pdf 
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T
his book presents important aspects
of the New-Keynesian theory of
monetary policy and its implications for
the practical decision-making of central
bankers today. Bridging the theory and
practice of monetary policy, it provides
an exposition on the key elements of 
the New Keynesian approach, outlines
important lessons for policymakers, and
points to new directions for further
research. Important policy implications
of the New-Keynesian approach such as
the case for forecast targeting as a strate-
gy for monetary policy, the combination
of model-based forecasts with cyclical
analysis, and strategies for crosschecking
model-based policy recommendations
are presented in detail. 
No quick summary can do justice to insights
and research findings of the highly reputed
authors who contributed to this volume. For
the uninitiated reader, however, a quick peek
at the Deutsche Bank Prize Winner’s principal
policy recommendation is in order. Building
on his seminal contributions to the New
Keynesian approach, Michael Woodford makes
“The case for forecast targeting as a monetary
policy strategy”. Forecasts have come to play
an increasingly important role both in policy
deliberations and in communications with the
public at central banks around the world. As
the most striking examples Michael Woodford
identifies the Bank of England, Sweden’s Riks  -
bank, Norway’s Norges Bank, and the Reserve
Bank of New Zealand, all of which conduct
policy on the basis of a procedure sometimes
referred to as “inflation-forecast targeting”.
Under this approach, the central bank con-
structs quantitative projections of the econo-
my’s expected future evolution based on the
way in which it intends to control short-term
interest rates, and public discussion of those
projections is a critical part of the way in
which the bank justifies the conduct of policy
to the public.
According to Woodford, inflation-forecast tar-
geting resolves the long-running debate between
the proponents of monetary rules, intended to
ensure confidence in the value of money over
time, and the proponents of discretionary
monetary policy, aimed at stabilizing the real
economy. A key element is the communica-
tion policy, which helps escape from the 
limitations of the traditional alternatives of
rigid rules or rudderless discretion. Woodford
addresses some important questions regarding
inflation-forecast targeting, for example,
whether only the inflation forecast should
matter, and if not, in what way forecasts of
other economic variables should affect policy
decisions. And he outlines a path for the U.S.
Federal Reserve towards an explicit policy of
inflation-forecast targeting.
While this new volume provides an accessible
introduction to the state of the art of monetary
policy analysis, not all of the questions raised
are settled yet. To take just one example from
the book, (admittedly selected with some home
bias), the authors of this article – House of
Finance researchers Günter Beck and Volker
Wieland – explore whether monetary aggre-
gates can play a special role when central bank
fails to perceive the true potential of the econ-
omy. In “Money in monetary policy design:
Monetary cross-checking in the new-Keynesian
model”, they investigate how monetary infor-
mation can be used to make policy more
robust in the presence of uncertainty. In doing
THE SCIENCE AND PRACTICE OF 
MONETARY POLICY TODAY
Prof. Günter Beck 
University of Mainz
Prof. Volker Wieland  
Goethe University of Frankfurt
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so, they make a case for the ECB’s two-pillar
strategy which gives money a prominent role.
Their paper utilizes a standard New-Keynesian
model. Money is part of it, but does not play a
causal role in inflation determination once the
central bank’s interest rate policy is accounted
for. Imperfect knowledge and persistent cen-
tral bank misperceptions regarding the econo-
my’s potential restore are shown to cause sus-
tained policy mistakes and trends in money
and inflation. A monetary policy strategy that
combines inflation forecast targeting with a
cross-check against long-run money growth is
found to help correct past policy errors and
improve inflation control.   
Certainly, this proposal, like others expressed
in the book, remains controversial and in need
of further investigation. Even more so as the
global financial crisis has renewed uncertain-
ties and given fresh impetus to research on the
proper policy response to asset prices and the
role of money and credit aggregates in mone-
tary policy. The House of Finance can surely
continue to play a helpful role as a venue for
exchange as well as a source of contributions.
Volker Wieland 
Editor

   The Science 
   and Practice 
of Monetary Policy 
   Today
   The Science 
   and Practice 
of Monetary Policy 
   Today
The book brings
together new 
contributions from
leading scientists
and experienced
practitioners and
policymakers 
honoring Prof.
Michael Woodford
(Colum bia
University), the
winner of the
Deutsche Bank
Prize in Financial
Economics 2007. 
It also reports on
the findings of a
scientific sympo-
sium organized by
the Center for
Financial Studies 
in the House of
Finance. 
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TOO BIG TO FAIL – A PROBLEM WHERE ANSWERS ARE ELUSIVE?
S
ince 2002 Jochen
Sanio has been
President of the
Bun  desanstalt für
Finanzdienst  lei  -
stungs    aufsicht
(Bafin). He repre-
sents Bafin on the
Financial Stability
Board.
How is it that an area like air traffic can 
succeed in regulating the way it deals with
complex products and processes whereas, for
finance and banking, regulation has just
failed?
Jochen Sanio: The unique and complex
world of risk peculiar to the international
financial system is unlike anything else. For
example, there is only a tightly limited systemic
risk in civil aviation. In contrast, an evaluation
of such risk in the world of finance is fraught
with immense difficulties due to the linkages
and interdependencies involved. Keeping 
systemic risk in check is the job of financial mar-
ket regulators – and one which nobody today is
really sure how to handle. In comparison, the
regulatory steps needed for the air traffic sec-
tor are relatively straightforward. 
Do you see any prospect of a basic consensus
being reached on financial markets – that is,
in terms of market discipline?
Jochen Sanio: No. For years, countless lobby-
ists have been trying to convince us of the
alleged effectiveness of market discipline for
which I can find no proof. It is a fantasy that
contrasts starkly with human behavior. Nobody
can seriously defend this line of thinking after
the financial crisis. For international financial
markets, only state regulation can put in place
the necessary safety standards, and only state
institutions with coercive power can enforce
adherence to such standards. 
What went wrong in financial markets that
such extensive measures have to be taken now,
and what exactly is their aim? 
Jochen Sanio: The financial crisis has revealed
serious weaknesses in regulatory standards,
with consequences that were grossly underesti-
mated. Regulatory loopholes were relentlessly
exploited by the financial industry at a global
level in order to pile up risks on an excessive
scale. We will be haunted by the dreadful
accusation of “regulatory failure” for a long
time to come. 
What shortcomings in the safety system are
you thinking about, for example?
Jochen Sanio: In my view decisive weak-
nesses were found in the capital adequacy
standard Basel I, and from the outset – 1988.
For certain risks, Basel I provided for unjusti-
fiably low capital adequacy rates – even to 
the point of some risks carrying a zero weight.
For over a decade things went well; it was
only from around 2004/2005 that the loop-
holes were exploited big time when a wave 
of US subprime mortgage securitizations 
swept through Europe. The entire internation-
al financial system is now in need of a general
overhaul.
Do you believe that there is a solution to the
“too big to fail” problem?
Jochen Sanio: In principle, yes, and the solu-
tion is actually quite simple: to revoke the “too
big to fail” doctrine in a credible manner only
one big bank has to be allowed to go bust.
However, due to the presence of interconnec-
tions within the international financial sys-
tem, this must not happen in an uncontrolled
manner. Rather, a coordinated international
receivership regime has to be in place, ensuring
that the exit of one player from the market does
not also lead to the downfall of other major
market players. Unfortunately, there are many
big players in the financial markets today that
in this sense are “too connected to fail”. 
Why have we not seen such an insolvency 
scenario so far – after all, there have been
enough opportunities? 
Jochen Sanio: Opportunities, yes, but not
the means. As long as we don’t have a uni-
form resolution regime we have to live with
the “too big to fail” rule in order to prevent a
systemic crisis – and, by applying it, we create
the greatest possible moral hazard and even
more systemic instability. This is quite para-
doxical and at the same time clearly unaccept-
able. It can only be hoped that we can quickly
bring about the necessary international har-
monization for winding down big financial
institutions. 
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T
he second conference within the
Economy, Criminal Law and Ethics
(ECLE) project – on the Financial Crisis,
Economic Law and Morals – was held at
Goethe University’s Institute for Law and
Finance on November 20-21, 2009. 
ECLE is an interdisciplinary project aimed 
at considering the options and limitations
of criminal law in the commercial sphere.
Building on the experience of the first confer-
ence (which focused on the role of the entre-
preneur), this conference was concerned with
the following three main themes. 
Participants first discussed general questions
on economic and constitutional law, that
is, with respect to the market and the state, as
well as the related ethical aspects of business
and economics. The latter, of course, have
received widespread attention during the last
few years. The discussion here more or less
explicitly focused on the topic of the public
interest and its place in business law; one of
concern to both specialists in economics and
constitutional and corporate law. 
It was found that a lot of questions still remain
unresolved. Economists are not agreed on a
common underlying theoretical concept;
experts in constitutional law fight over the
extent to which constitutions allow for 
economic management; and corporate law
experts are unable to find a formula for 
the special requirements and duties of capital
enterprises. This is hardly surprising given 
the diverse regulations involved (e.g. for 
commercial activities, corporate stock, and
securities), which partly restrict corporate
action, and yet also provide for much discre-
tion – i.e. as regards how large enterprises
define a set of principles for determining to
which extent they maximize profits or meet
public welfare goals. 
All participants agreed that the discussion on
this topic should be continued and even inten-
sified. There is a need for a graded system of
responsibility and responsibility restrictions.
The constitutionally necessary restriction of
criminal law can only be maintained by a
counterbalancing system of responsibility
under administrative, corporate and private
law; one which shows the limits of criminal
law and points out in particular where this 
is unnecessary. If work in this respect is left
undone, then the practice of criminal law,
with its inclination to develop autonomous
and partly genuine ethical principles, will
enter into the gaps left by other fields of 
law, and will establish responsibility standards
that exceed serious standards of economic
management.
Secondly, the conference debated the issue of
breach of trust, particularly with regard to
the Siemens case which seems to have played
a greater role than originally intended. When
viewed in a larger context, it is perhaps sensi-
ble to look at cases arising from the financial
crisis from the perspective of corruption.
Thirdly, the conference also focused on new
phenomena in corporate law, namely in
the context of the law relating to economic
offences. Lawyers and defense counsels fully
informed participants about recent cases, pro-
viding them with technical details and outlin-
ing the legal consequences involved. 
This conference demonstrated the importance
of continuing a discourse on criminal law in
research and practice, and in public discus-
sions.
ILF SYMPOSIUM ON THE FINANCIAL CRISIS, 
ECONOMIC LAW AND MORALS
State Secretary Nicola Beer
Prof. Klaus Lüderssen
Prof. Manfred Wandt
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SELECTED HOUSE OF FINANCE PUBLICATIONS
Baums, T. (2010) 
“Die Unabhängigkeit des Vergütungsberaters”,  
ILF Working Papers No. 111
Beck, R. (2010)
“Can IT Lean Against the Wind? Lessons From
the Global Financial Crisis”, 
forthcoming in Communications of the ACM
Elsas, R., Hackethal, A., Holzhäuser, M.
(2010)
“The Anatomy of Bank Diversification”, 
forthcoming in Journal of Banking and Finance
Fuchs-Schündeln, N., Krueger, D.,
Sommer, M. (2010)
“Inequality Trends for Germany in the Last Two
Decades: A Tale of Two Countries”,
Review of Economic Dynamics, Vol. 13(1), pp.
103–132 
Gerlach, S., edited with Cobham, D., 
Eitrheim, O., Qvigstad, J. F. (2010)
“Inflation Targeting Twenty Years On”, 
Cambridge University Press, forthcoming
Haar, B. (2009)
“Bankrecht, Europäischer Bankenmarkt, Kon  -
zern  recht, Verbraucherkredit – Regelungs  grund-
sätze”, 
Basedow / Hopt / Zimmermann (Hrsg.), Hand  -
wör    ter  buch des Europäischen Privatrechts,
Tübingen (Mohr, Siebeck), pp. 162
Hoffmann, F., Pfeil, S. (2010)
“Reward for Luck in a Dynamic Agency Model”,
forthcoming in Review of Financial Studies
Kraft, H. (2009)
“Optimal Portfolios with Stochastic Short Rate:
Pifalls When the Short Rate Is Non-Gaussian or
the Market Price of Risk Is Un  bounded”,
International Journal of Theoretical and Applied
Finance, Vol. 12, pp. 767–796 
Krahnen, J. P., Günter, F. (2009)
“The Future of Securitization”, 
Prudent Lending Restored, edited by Fuchita, Y.,
Herring, R., and Litau, R., Brookings Institution,
Washington D.C., pp. 105–161
Langenbucher, K. (2010)
“Prospektive Rechtsprechungsänderungen im
französischen Recht”, 
FS Koziol
Laubach, T., Edge, R., Williams, J. C. (2010)
“Welfare-Maximizing Monetary Policy under
Parameter Uncertainty”, 
Journal of Applied Econometrics, Vol. 25, pp.
125–143  
Laux, Chr., Leuz, Chr. (2009)
“The Crisis of Fair Value Accounting: Making
Sense of the Recent Debate”,
Accounting, Organizations and Society, Vol. 34
(6–7), pp. 826–34
Maurer, R., Mitchell, O. S., Rogalla, R. (2010)
“The Effect of Uncertain Labour Income and
Social Security on Life-Cycle Portfolios”,
NBER-Working Paper, No. 15682
Muntermann, J., Ende, B. (2010)
“Opacity and Exclusivity in Electronic Securities
Trading: The Case of Dark Pools“,  
Multikonferenz Wirtschaftsinformatik, 2010,
Göttingen 
Schmitt, P., Meyer, S., Skiera, B. (2010)
“Überprüfung des Zusammenhangs 
zwischen Weiterempfehlungsbereitschaft 
und Kundenwert”, 
Schmalenbachs Zeitschrift für betriebswirt  -
schaftliche Forschung, Vol. 62, forthcoming
Wandt, M. (2009)
“Solvency II in der Rechtsanwendung”, 
Verlag Versicherungs  wirt  schaft, Karlsruhe, 
pp. 1–247
Walz, U., Cumming, D., Schmidt, D. (2010)
“Legality and Venture Capital Governance
around the World”, 
Journal of Business Venturing, Vol. 25 (1), 
pp. 54–72
Wieland, V., Cogan, J. F., Cwik, T., 
Taylor, J. B. (2010)
“New Keynesian versus Old Keynesian 
Govern  ment Spending Multipliers”, 
forthcoming in Journal of Economic Dynamics
and Control, Vol. 34 
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RESEARCH OUTSIDE THE HOUSE OF FINANCE
SECURITIZATION, TRANSPARENCY AND LIQUIDITY, Marco Pagano and Paolo Volpin, Securitization,
Transparency and Liquidity (February 10, 2009), in AFA 2010 Atlanta Meetings Paper
It is common to place a good part of the blame for the financial crisis on the poor transparency
that accompanied the issuance of asset back securities (ABS). This paper presents a model in
which issuers of structured bonds choose coarse and opaque ratings to enhance the liquidity of
their primary market, at the cost of reducing liquidity in secondary markets. The authors show
that the degree of transparency is inefficiently low when the social value of secondary market
liquidity exceeds the private value, and that transparency is greater when the issuers restrain the
issue size or when they tranche it. The authors also analyze the effects of two forms of ex-post
public liquidity provision: one intended for distressed bank holders, the other aimed at support-
ing the ABS price in secondary markets. The former is ex-post efficient, but reduces the issuer’s
ex-post incentives to opt for transparency.
This article is available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1337898
Prof. Ester Faia, Goethe University
IS TRUST IN FINANCIAL MARKETS CREATING WELFARE – OR IS WELFARE CREATING TRUST? 
Jefferson Duarte, Stephan Siegel and Lance A. Young, Trust and Credit (February 17, 2009) in AFA 2010
Atlanta Meetings Paper
This is the key research question of the paper titled “Trust and Credit” by Jefferson Duarte,
Stephan Siegel, and Lance Young. Economists have long recognized the importance of trust for
the development of financial markets. But it was not until the financial crisis that trust made its
way into the limelight for financial researchers. Due to its innovative research design, this report
won the best paper award at the 2009 meeting of the German Finance Association hosted by the
House of Finance. 
Empirical evidence suggests a robust positive correlation between trust and for example economic
growth, but is silent about causation. Duarte, Siegel, and Young provide micro level evidence that
trust has indeed first order economic effects. Using transaction level data from a US peer-to-peer
lending site (Prosper.com), the authors show that borrowers perceived untrustworthy are signifi-
cantly less likely to obtain a loan. Indeed, such borrowers must pay a promised interest rate that is
182 basis points higher in order to have the same probability of obtaining a loan as those consid-
ered trustworthy.
The paper uses a novel and innovative method to measure trustworthiness: people unrelated to
loan transactions were asked to evaluate photographs posted online by potential borrowers in order
to construct a new and, most importantly, strictly exogenous measure of a person's trustworthi-
ness. The results suggest that trust does indeed facilitate economic transactions, even in an envi-
ronment characterized by readily available contract enforcement mechanisms. As an intriguing side
point, the results of the paper also suggest that a person's appearance contains clues about past and
future behavior above and beyond the information typically contained in his/her credit report. 
This article is available at: http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1343275
Prof. Mark Wahrenburg, Goethe University
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DEUTSCHE BANK ENDOWS
FINANCE CHAIR
Deutsche Bank has agreed to endow a chair in
International Finance at the House of Finance.
The relevant contracts have been signed by the
bank’s chief executive, Dr. Josef Ackermann,
and representatives from Goethe University. It
is envisaged that research conducted under
this chair will also analyze the implications of
the financial crisis for the structure of financial
markets worldwide.
COMMERZBANK STIFTUNG
SPONSORS DOCTORAL 
PROGRAMS
The Commerzbank Stiftung has approved a
grant of €15,500 (per year for a period of three
years) in support of doctoral programs at the
House of Finance. The grant will foster HoF
endeavors to continuously enhance student
knowledge of scientific methods. It will also
enable the grant applicants – Professors Brigitte
Haar and Roman Beck – to invite international
faculty to help broaden the curriculum in this
field.
ROMAN INDERST RECEIVES
RENOWNED GERMAN RESEARCH
AWARD
Economist Roman Inderst
has been awarded the
Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz-
Preis, which comes with an
endowment of €2.5 mil-
lion. Inderst, at 39 years
the youngest of this year’s
prize winners, is already
ranked among the ten 
best economists within the
Germanspeaking world. He was honored for his
overall work. Retail finance and competition
policy are the main focus of Inderst’s research.
POLICY PLATFORM INAUGURATED
The Policy Platform pools the policy-relevant contributions of members of the House of Finance as well as Goethe University’s Faculty of Economics
and Business Administration and its Faculty of Law. This is a joint project with the Center for Financial Studies (CFS), the Institute for Law and Finance
(ILF), and the Institute of Monetary and Financial Stability (IMFS). Contributions are published either as “Policy Letters” or as more comprehensive
“White Papers”. Their objective is to inform policy makers, market participants and also the general public in a non-technical way about issues cur-
rently pertinent to financial markets and their regulation, monetary economics and central banking, as well as financial law and public finance.
Intensive workshops with renowed participants from government and financial institutions complement the Policy Letters and White Papers. One of
the first visitors in this context was Dr. Jens Weidmann, the economic and financial policy advisor of Germany’s Federal Chancellor, Angela Merkel.
For more information please see: www.hof.uni-frankfurt.de/de/Policy-Platform
FRANKFURT INSTITUTE FOR
RISK MANAGEMENT AND
REGULATION (FIRM) FUNDS
TWO RESEARCH PROPOSALS
FIRM is a cross-university institute. The insti-
tute's main concern is to carry out ambitious
research and teaching in the area of risk man-
agement and regulation. As a result of a first call
for research proposals two projects closely
related to the House of Finance and Goethe
University were selected: “Accounting and Pro-
Cyclicity – Implications for Financial Stability
and Regulation”, submitted by Christian Laux,
and “Incentives, Risk Preference and Leveraged
Finance: Implications for Risk”, a project con-
ducted by Uwe Walz. 
THE NECESSITY OF WORLDWIDE 
HARMONIZED COMPETITION 
REGULATION
On January 19, Dr. Horst
Satzky a partner at the
Frank  furt law firm of
Hen  geler Mueller, gave a
presentation titled “Com  -
petition Law as a Nor  ma  -
tive Order”. Satzky had
accepted an invitation to
the House of Finance made
by Prof. Alexander Peukert of the Cluster of
Excellence at Goethe Uni  ver  sity and Prof.
Brigitte Haar of the PhD Program for Law and
Economics of Money and Finance. His speech
focused on the fundamentals of competition as
a normative order, the complex nature of the
subject, and the global competition between
national competition laws as well as the
chances for their harmonization. It was fol-
lowed by a comment from an economic per-
spective made by Prof. Roman Inderst of
Goethe University. 
MATHFINANCE COLLOQUIUM STARTS ON APRIL 15, 2010
The MathFinance Colloquim is a means of incorporating competence in mathematics and 
computer sciences into the House of Finance while fostering integration among the disciplines it
covers. The Colloquium is comprised of a 45-minute presentation of research results, plus a 
15-minute discussion on topics of common interest to participants. The first speaker will be 
Prof. Alexander Schied from Mann  heim University.
For more information please see: 
http://www.hof.uni-frankfurt.de/en/Events/MathFinance-Colloquium.html
Dr. Horst Satzky Prof. 
Roman Inderst
Prof. Krahnen, Dr. Weidmann, Prof. Siekmann
(left to right)
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QUARTERLY EVENT CALENDAR
APRIL
Friday, 9
th Goethe Business School: 
3pm GMAT Seminar and Information Session
Friday, 9
th CFS Compact Seminar:
4 – 8pm “Projektfinan  zierung und Public Private
Partner  ships”, 
Speaker: Dr. Ruprecht von Heusinger  
(EUROHYPO AG)
Monday, 12
th Finance Seminar:
5.15 – 6.30pm Speaker: Luc Laeven, 
International Monetary Fund
Thursday, 15
th MathFinance Colloquium:
5.15pm Speaker: Prof. Dr. Alexander Schied, 
Mannheim University
Friday, 16
th – ILF Symposium: 
Saturday 17
th 30-jähriges Bestehen des Strafverteidiger,
attendance only on request
Tuesday, 20
th Finance Seminar:
5.15 – 6.30pm Speaker: Kristian Milterson,
Copenhagen Business School
Thursday, 22
th  – Ph.D. Conference:
Saturday, 24
th “European Financial Law Network“, 
Organisation: Prof. Dr. Brigitte Haar and 
Prof. Dr. Theodor Baums, Goethe University
Saturday, 24
th Deutsch-Amerikanische Juristen-
Vereinigung (DAJV): Fachgruppentag 2010
Organisation: ILF, 
attendance only on request
Tuesday, 27
th Finance Seminar:
5.15 – 6.30pm Speaker: Jose-Luis Peydro Alcalde, 
European Central Bank
Thursday, 29
th – CFS Seminar: 
Friday, 30
th “Zukunftsgestaltung: Die Finanzbranche
9am – 6pm  von morgen denken“,
Speaker: Stephan Meyer, denkstelle; 
Axel Liebetrau, PortaFinancia
Thursday, 29
th HoF Brown Bag Seminar:
12pm “Managing Gobal Outsourcing
Relationships in the Financial Industry”,
Speaker: Robert Gregory, E-Finance Lab
MAY
Monday, 3
rd EFL Jour-Fix: 
5pm “Softwareentwicklung offshore – 
Warum so viele Projekte scheitern”, 
Speaker: Prof. Dr. Peter Buxmann,
TU Darmstadt
Thursday, 6
th ILF Corporate Finance Summit
10am attendance only on request
Friday, 7
th Goethe Business School:
5pm Information Session
Wednesday, 12
th Finance Seminar: 
5.15 – 6.30pm Speaker: Jerome Detemple, Boston University
Wednesday, 19
th CFS Colloquium: 
5.30pm “From National to European Regulation”,
Speaker: Dr. H. Onno Ruding, 
Chairman, Centre for Europa Policy Studies
(LEPS), Brussels
Thursday, 20
th HoF Brown Bag Seminar: 
12pm “The new legal framework for manage-
ment remuneration in Germany”, 
Speaker: Prof. Dr. Katja Langenbucher, 
Goethe University
MARCH
Thursday, 20
th ILF Guest Lecture: 
7pm “The 'Roadmap to Piercing' in Dutch
Group Company Law“, 
Speaker: Prof. Dr. Steef Bartman, 
Leiden University, NL
Tuesday, 25
th Finance Seminar: 
5.15 – 6.30pm Speaker: Claus Munk, 
Aarhus University
JUNE
Tuesday, 1
st Finance Seminar: 
5.15 – 6.30pm Speaker: Allaudeen Hameed, 
National University of Singapore
Wednesday, 2
nd Finance Seminar: 
12 – 1pm Speaker: Murillo Campello, 
University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign
Monday, 7
th EFL Jour-Fixe: 
5pm “Hedge Fund Activism and Risk”, 
Speaker: Taro Niggemann, E-Finance Lab
Tuesday, 8
th Finance Seminar: 
5.15 – 6.30pm Speaker: Jose Penalva Zuasti, 
Carlos III University of Madrid
Wednesday, 9
th Finance Seminar: 
5.15 – 6.30pm Speaker: Hong Liu, 
OLIN Business School, Washington University
in St.Louis 
Monday, 14
th  – Eden Doctoral Seminar on Empirical 
Friday, 18
th Financial Accounting Research, 
Speaker: Prof. Christian Leuz (and others), 
http://www.eiasm.org/ frontofice/eden_
announcement.asp?event_id=727
Tuesday, 15
th   Finance Seminar: 
5.15 – 6.30pm Speaker: Søren Hvidkjær, 
Copenhagen Business School
Thursday, 24
th HoF Brown Bag Seminar: 
12pm Speaker: Prof. Dr. Uwe Walz, 
Goethe University
Tuesday, 29
th Finance Seminar: 
5.15 – 6.15pm Speaker: Ralph Koijen, 
Booth School of Business, University of Chicago 
Please refer to http://www.hof.uni-frankfurt.de/veranstaltungen for
continuous updates of the event calendar.
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Address:
House of Finance
Goethe University Frankfurt
Grüneburgplatz 1
D-60323 Frankfurt am Main
Contact Person:
Prof. Dr. Wolfgang König
Tel. +49 (0)69 798 34000
Fax +49 (0)69 33910
E-Mail: info@hof.uni-frankfurt.de
Internet: www.hof.uni-frankfurt.de
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